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Abstract: The aerospace industry is constantly looking to adopt new technologies to increase the
performance of the machines and procedures they employ. In recent years, the industry has tried to
introduce more electric aircraft and integrated vehicle health management technologies to achieve
various benefits, such as weight reduction, lower fuel consumption, and a decrease in unexpected
failures. In this experiment, data obtained from the simulation model of an electric braking system
employing a brushed DC motor is used to determine its health. More specifically, the data are used
to identify faults, namely open circuit fault, intermittent open circuit, and jamming. The variation
of characteristic parameters during normal working conditions and when faults are encountered
are analysed qualitatively. The analysis is used to select the features that are ideal to be fed into the
reasoner. The selected features are braking force, wheel slip, motor temperature, and motor angular
displacement, as these parameters have very distinct profiles upon injection of each of the faults.
Due to the availability of clean data, a data-driven approach is adopted for the development of the
reasoner. In this work, a Long Short-Term Memory Neural Network time series classifier is proposed
for the identification of faults. The performance of this classifier is then compared with two others—K
Nearest Neighbour time series and Time Series Forest classifiers. The comparison of the reasoners is
then carried out in terms of accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score.
Keywords: IVHM; fault detection; diagnostic reasoner; neural networks; digital twin; landing
gear; aircraft
1. Introduction
Ever since the inception of commercial aviation, civil aircraft have been relying on
gas turbine engines to power up their systems. As an industry that survives on wafer-thin
profits and is bound by scores of safety regulations, all stakeholders, from manufacturers to
operators, are continually looking to improve their methods to extract maximum efficiency
from both the machines and humans they employ. In line with this goal, they are con-
stantly testing new technologies to either replace existing systems or integrate with them.
Two technologies that are rapidly and extensively being tested and deployed for better
performance are more electric aircraft (MEA) and integrated vehicle health management
(IVHM), as well as digital twins for different levels of fidelity in a variety of applications
ranging from system development to vehicle health monitoring [1–4].
Grounding the aircraft for activities pertaining to maintenance make it a non-performing
asset and causes the aircraft operators to lose out on considerable revenue. However, owing
to its paramount importance, maintenance work in the aerospace industry is undertaken at
regular intervals according to pre-determined schedules. This means that every aircraft,
irrespective of its current health or its propensity to develop a fault, is grounded according
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 9171. https://doi.org/10.3390/app11199171 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/applsci
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 9171 2 of 20
to schedule. Although discovering unexpected faults during regular maintenance will
prevent dangerous situations from happening, this finding will most likely lead to an
extensive delay in the maintenance schedule. This is because the resources to resolve the
fault may not be immediately available. This, in turn, can cause a potential disruption in
the maintenance schedule and overall airline operation, affecting the overall costs of the
operation [5].
Monitoring an aerospace vehicle’s health can help evaluate the condition of the sys-
tems, prevent unnecessary maintenance, and increase the vehicle’s useful life. In case
abnormal equipment behaviour is observed during the vehicle operation, proper arrange-
ments can be made to address the issue and decrease the probability of a dangerous
situation. By using the data generated by the health monitoring systems, original equip-
ment manufacturers (OEMs) benefit by using the data generated by the aircraft to improve
the existing systems for more optimal performance or develop new ones more suited for
operation [6].
With the increasing availability of data, development of technology with the internet-
of-things (IoT) components, and the realisation that such data can be used to make better
decisions for system design and maintainability, the field of IVHM is attracting high-profile
stakeholders who are keen to determine and tap its full potential. Prognostics and diagnosis
of aircraft systems carried out by health monitoring assets provide such stakeholders with
valuable data to detect abnormalities, optimise maintenance schedules, and for better
estimations of the system remaining useful life (RUL) [6–8].
For fault identification, reasoners developed from neural network (NN) algorithms
become an asset for health management applications. By adequately training such rea-
soners, data obtained from the sensor systems can be used accordingly to provide insight
into the overall system performance and modify the maintenance regime. A reasoner with
good accuracy helps achieve the dual objective of saving time as well as other resources,
such as manpower since it could potentially eliminate manual inspections of the target
system [1,9,10].
The objective of this paper is to develop and propose a reasoner with good accuracy
to identify selected faults that can occur in an aircraft electric braking system (EBS) devel-
oped from three different machine learning (ML) algorithms. The introduction of electric
actuators on MEA platforms introduces new fault modes to systems that require further
study to cement its applications on modern aircraft. It studies the characteristics of the
parameters provided by an EBS digital model working under ideal conditions and induced
fault modes. This is followed by the identification of appropriate time series attributes to
eliminate redundancies from being fed to the data-driven reasoner. Finally, the comparison
of the algorithm’s performance is undertaken for further development for an EBS reasoner.
2. Literature Review
Landing gear or the undercarriage of an aircraft is one of the critical systems in
an aircraft, especially during taxiing, take-off and landing. It performs vital functions,
such as supporting the weight of the aircraft, absorbing impact upon touchdown, and
providing braking and directional control. Typical parts of a landing gear include oleo strut,
tyres, steering actuator, up and down locks, trailing arm or telescopic legs, and retracting
actuator [11]. The braking system provides the braking action, which reduces braking
distance and consequently increases payload capacity [12].
Commercial aircraft have primarily relied on hydraulic and pneumatic systems for
most of their actuation systems. Recent commercial aircraft platforms have seen the
introduction of electromechanical actuation systems in an attempt to utilise electrical
power in more systems due to potential favourable advantages, such as a reduction in
weight, fuel costs, and operating costs. Moreover, electrical power can be stepped up and
down, stored, and, in turn, controlled and distributed to other systems easily according
to their requirements due to advancements in the field of power electronics [4]. With
the introduction of a 100 per cent electrical actuator in the A380’s thrust reversal system
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and B787 replacing its pneumatic circuit with an electrical counterpart in the braking
system propelled, the move towards More Electric Aircraft, thereby making the possibility
of achieving All-Electric Aircraft, appears plausible in the near future [2]. Other major
players in the industry have also adopted the MEA approach, with SAFRAN developing a
fully electrical braking system and BAE introducing electrical flight controls to military
aircraft [12,13].
The incorporation of more electric components and actuators demands greater electric
power generation, thereby requiring cooling and control systems of greater complexity.
It is also worth noting that a significant weight reduction benefit of switching from hy-
draulic/pneumatic to electric actuation will only be realised once significant improvements
have been made to the current power electronic modules. Another major challenge with
MEA is evaluating the safety and reliability of the new designs. The cost and effort required
to secure the initial certification for these new designs are considered prohibitively high, as
the aerospace industry relies very much on legacy certification. Hence, the use of digital
technology for system design and testing acquires a bigger dimension for new technology
introduction [14–16].
Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) was first proposed by NASA in 1992
to determine the health of systems before, during and after their period of operation, with
the goal being to avoid catastrophic failures. By introducing IVHM, NASA hoped to reduce
maintenance and labour costs, and increase reliability and availability of equipment [17].
IVHM helps evaluate the health of systems in the aerospace sector through four approaches:
Diagnosis, Prognosis, Automated Inspections, and Anomaly Detection.
IVHM aims to provide a holistic approach to vehicle health management. Until its
introduction, the health of individual components was monitored. The goal of IVHM
is to assess the overall health of the vehicle by integrating the health status of various
components and taking the inter-dependability of systems into account. IVHM intends
to achieve this by incorporating various hardware and software into the system, such
as sensors, reasoning algorithms, maintenance planners, databases for storing health
parameters, etc., which aid in monitoring the health during operations.
Fault diagnosis aims to identify the fault that has occurred from the control character-
istics and sensor data available. It involves monitoring system characteristics for anomalies
and analysing them to determine the type and nature of fault that has occurred. Fault prog-
nosis focuses on predicting the future health condition of the system. Prognosis is mainly
used to calculate RUL and predict any faults that are likely to occur in the future. Various
reasoning methods are used for the purpose of fault diagnosis and prognosis and the same
are discussed by T. V. Tung and B. Yang [18]. Reasoners or reasoning systems are among
the many tools that may be utilised to carry out a diagnosis. They are algorithms that use
various strategies known as reasoning strategies to deduce faults. C. M. Ezhilarasu et al. [1]
introduces various reasoning strategies and systems for fault detection in her paper.
3. Modelling and Simulation of an Aircraft Electric Braking System
The failure modes, effects and criticality of the various systems and components in an
aircraft’s landing gear with a brushed EMA are discussed in brief in this section. Consid-
ering how failure modes are assessed, a failure in the braking unit could be catastrophic
as it could lead to the aircraft overshooting the runway and potentially the loss of lives
from the incident. Similarly, a failure of the anti-skid braking system (ABS) would result
in a significant reduction in braking performance, becoming a major critical event with
potentially serious injuries and loss of life.
As a whole, the landing gear is a safety-critical system, and the braking unit is
certainly one of the most important systems it hosts. In order to comply with MEA
approaches, components such as electromechanical actuator (EMA) are suited to replace
existing hydraulic braking systems and, with that, the necessity to study new failure modes
attached to them. A number of possible failures of an EBS and their effects are listed in
Table 1. IoT faults, more specifically to sensor/actuator and interface components faults,
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 9171 4 of 20
are the only non-catastrophic events listed as they could potentially reduce the braking
performance, but their role in feedback loops can cause the braking force to deviate from
expected values.
Table 1. Simplified FMECA from an EBS.
Component Failure Failure Effects Critical Assessment
Electric Motor (EMA)
Winding Damage Overheating








Open/Short Circuit Thermal Runaway
Leadscrew (EMA)
Worn-Out Threading Control Loss of theEMA Catastrophic
Structural Damage No Force Applied onBrake
IoT
Calibration Faults Incorrect SensorReadings Major
Bias Fault
3.1. Electric Braking System Simulation
For developing an appropriate reasoner for the EBS, a substantial amount of data is
required in order to train the system to detect any anomalies. An EBS model was provided
by [19], developed in the MATLAB/Simulink environment with Simscape components.
The model employs a brushless DC motor to actuate the EMA in the aircraft’s single
EBS with ABS included serving the purpose of providing relevant data for training the
reasoner. The environment in which the simulation is working is on ideal conditions, i.e.,
no external or environmental conditions are affecting the braking. The model is a simple
representation of a single electromechanical actuator providing the necessary braking force
to an aircraft. An ABS system is included in the model to give the simulation a more
realistic approach. The model used has three main layers, starting from the overall aircraft
speed calculation layer, the ABS controller, and the EMA layer. An overview of the model
is found in Figure 1.
A DC brushed motor block from the Simscape environment provides electric and
torque parameters useful for the model. Usually, a four-actuator brake per wheel would be
used in real applications, increasing the system redundancy and robustness. The failure of
one actuator on a four-EMA system will certainly reduce the effects on aircraft braking,
but the purpose of having this one-EMA model is to obtain more visual and impactful
information for data analysis [20].
A number of sensors are integrated into the model to verify that the components are
performing their intended functions, evaluate the EBS performance as a whole, and detect
abnormal conditions. Temperature, torque and force sensors are included in the model and
are the main source of data for the reasoner. Starting with temperature, an electric motor
overheating may occur due to a number of causes mentioned previously, such as jamming,
bearing and winding failures, over-voltage or other poor environmental conditions [21].
A force sensor is integrated into the model to evaluate the actuator performance and
the force applied to the brake. Torque sensors are also located in the leadscrew, and it is
used to gauge the torque provided by the EMA electric motor. Other specific resultant data
obtained from the model are the brake pressure, resultant torque (difference between wheel
torque and brake torque), aircraft and wheel velocity, wheel slip and stopping distance.
Table 2 shows a list of signals and data obtained from the model.
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The model uses generic values for the simulation to generate useful data for the
reasoner. Some parameters used include the initial aircraft linear velocity of 88 m/s,
landing mass of 8000 kg, wheel radius of 0.34 m, and maximum brake pressure of 30,000 Pa.
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The simulation runs for 60 s, with the braking procedure starting 1 s after the simulation
starts. Results from the model aircraft behaviour are shown in Figure 2.
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Once the braking signal is set, the aircraft speed decreases s oothly with ti e, show-
ing wheel slip being stabilised by the ABS and the vehicle coming to a halt at around
1800 metres. Figure 3 shows more specific data obtained from the EMA, such as motor
power, torque, force and shaft displacement. It is noticeable how the ABS and motor
controller fluctuate to obtain a smooth braking procedure.
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3.2. Fault Mode Integr and Simulation
Having obtained the EBS normal performance model ata, fault mo es are selected
acco ding to their critic lity and th variet of effects they c uld provide for data analysis
purposes. Electrical and mechanical faults being critical, an electric motor open circuit (OC),
intermittent open circuit (IOC) and motor jamming faults were selected for data processing.
Undesirable situations as a result of these fault modes could lead to catastrophic accidents.
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Thus, the study of these faults is important to assure IVHM capabilities and increase the
systems’ reliability.
The jamming condition is simulated by applying increased friction in the motor shaft.
Some noticeable results are the lack of braking force as the actuator does not make contact
with the brake, disturbance in the wheel slip, and no change in the aircraft velocity. Motor
power is greatly increased as the actuator controller battles to overcome the jamming
condition. This situation certainly has the potential to turn into a catastrophic accident.
The OC and IOC are integrated into the model by opening the circuit with a switch.
The OC opens 20 s after the braking procedure starts, halting the actuator activity com-
pletely, and displaying a complete disruption in the aircraft braking and the actuator power.
Similarly, the IOC is set to occur every 5 s, which halts the EBS activity intermittently but
still managing to stop the aircraft with a noticeable reduction in performance. Some data
comparing the OC and IOC are shown in Figure 4.
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4. Reasoner Development
Using the seven-step process presented by [22], ML models are used for the reasoner
development. The process starts with data gathering, preparation and model selection.
It continues with model training and evaluation and finishes with parameter tuning and
prediction. The performance of a classifier is often measured by its accuracy, but the
reasoner performance can also be measured by precision rate, recall rate and F1 score, and
their formulas can be found in Equations (1)–(4):
Accuracy =
Number of Correct Predictions








True Positive + False Negative
(3)
F1− Score = 2 Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall
(4)
After evaluation, the parameters related to the model are fine-tuned. Necessary
changes are made to them, which could potentially increase the model performance. In
real-world applications, supervised learning is commonly employed for fault detection and
diagnosis, where the input and expected output are available. The process of fault isolation
and diagnosis is fundamentally a pattern recognition problem. When signatures of a fault
are used to map it to an exact fault case, the process becomes a classification problem [23].
The performance of a classifier is often represented in the form of a confusion matrix.
It is often referred to as an error matrix or confusion chart and represents the actual labels
of instances in the dataset versus the label assigned to it. Figure 5 shows the format used
for the EBS reasoner development. The table shows the number of true positives, true
negatives, false positives and false negatives generated by the classifier. The diagonal
elements in the confusion matrix indicate the correct predictions made by the classifier.
The entire process of reasoner development is illustrated in Appendix A.
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4.1. Data Generation and Feature Selection
D ta w e extracted such that he faults occurred at various instances of time in the
process of braking. This means that the velocity of the aircraft at the time of occurrence of
fault varies throughout the dataset. The data provided are in the form of a time series. Up
to nineteen such possible input parameters are available from the si ulation of the model.
The time interval between data points generated is 0.5 s, and the total number of data
samples used in this case is 120. The mode of the length of the data series is 121, and the
available data are split into training and testing datasets in a 3:1 ratio. The split is random,
and care was taken to ensure that the test and train datasets did not contain the same cases.
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Efforts are made to include possible extreme case scenarios so that all possible cases within
the distribution are addressed. Each series of data is classified into three depending on the
condition they represent, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Data Obtained from EBS Model.
Feature Name Label
EMA Electric Motor Open Circuit Fault 1
EMA Electric Motor Intermittent Open Circuit Fault 2
EMA Electric Motor Jamming 3
Features are quantified properties that are put into a model, and up to 19 different pa-
rameters are generated from the EBS model simulation, generating 19 factorial or 1.2 × 107
possible combinations as input features. Feeding all the features into the ML models are
not a viable option due to the high number of combinations, which will translate into more
processing time. In cases with a high number of data combinations, a trade-off between
accuracy and processing time is considered.
The comparative study of the previous sections shows the braking force being different
in the normal braking condition simulation and the three fault modes. The wheel slip
profile shows major differences for each scenario and is a parameter derived from wheel
and vehicle speed. The other parameters found with major variability are the motor
angular displacement and motor temperature which tends to change at the earliest sign of
an anomaly.
The braking force is used as the input feature for the univariate. For multivariate
models, the number of features to be fed into the model was arbitrarily chosen as four.
These four parameters are braking force, wheel slip, motor angular displacement, and
motor temperature, as they display observable variation during each of the scenarios.
4.2. Long Short-Term Memory Reasoner
With the data from the EMA model simulation, the prospect of a reasoner employing
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) is studied. The ability of remembrance demonstrated
by this NN approach makes it of particular interest in applications related to forecasting
and time series classification [24]. This ability comes from the incorporation of a memory
cell in its architecture.. Each cell takes in an input, the previous cell state, the weight and
biases parameters determine what values are passed on to the next cell and which data are
retained or ultimately forgotten [25]. Formulas governing the LSTM model used can be
found from Equations (5)–(10) [26]:
Cell state, ct = ft  c + it  gt (5)
Hidden state, ht = ot  σc(ct) (6)
Input gate, it = σg(WiXt + Riht−1 + bi) (7)
Output gate, ot = σg
(
WoXt + Rght−1 + bo
)
(8)
Forget gate, ft = σg
(
W f Xt + R f ht−1 + b f
)
(9)
Cell candidate, gt = σc(WoXt + Roht−1 + bo) (10)
where W, X, R, h and b denote weight, input, recurrent weights, and biases. The gate
activation function is represented by σg.
The use of LSTM is chosen for the experiment due to a number of reasons, including
the ability to learn information in a considerably long time period, ability to remember
previous states, LSTM’s insensitivity to gap length, noise handling, and no need for fine-
tuning of parameters [27,28].
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MATLAB R2020b was used for the LSTM reasoner modelling. The implemented
model consists of five layers which are namely the input, bi-directional, fully-connected,
softmax and classification layers as shown in Figure 6. The input layer takes in the sequence
followed by the bi-directional layer responsible for studying the dependencies through
the length of the time series. The activation function for state and cell in this layer is a
hyperbolic tangent function on which the sigmoid function dictates the gate activation
function.
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Figure 6. LSTM Layers Architecture.
The fully connected layer is a feed-forward neural network, and the number of hidden
layers within this network is customisable. This is followed by a final layer of activation
function, the softmax layer, which is a normalisation function that converts the output of
the previous layer to a value in the range of 0 to 1. This layer then passes the values to the
next classification layer, which calculates the cross-entropy between the prediction and the
classified label.
Cross-entropy is defined as the extra bits required to represent an event from one dis-
tribution to another [29]. The lower the value of cross-entropy, the better the classification
of the label. The cross-entropy function employed by the training network is defined in [30]
and is shown in Equation (11).








witni ln yni (11)
in which N denotes the number of samples, i and w represent the class and weight, respec-
tively. tni corresponds to the class of the nth sample and yni to the output for the nth sample
of ith class. The learning rate optimiser employed in the model is an adaptive moment
estimation. LSTM reasoner model parameters are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. LSTM Model Parameters.







Training Set: 90 Instances
(32 OC; 28 IOC;
30 Jamming)














4.3. Time Series Forest Reasoner
The Time Series Forest (TSF) is an ensemble of time series trees (TST). Time series are
split into random intervals, and features are extracted from each interval. Such features
are the mean, standard deviation, and slope of the least square regression line. TSTs are
constructed with these features as inputs. The splitting function used here, as proposed
in [31], is called entrance gain, which is a measure of entropy and margin, described in
Equations (12) and (13).
Entropy = −∑Cc=1 γc log γc (12)
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Margin = min
n=1,2,..,N
| f nk (t1, t2)− τ| (13)
where γc corresponds to an instance of cth class, f nk denotes nth instance of kth feature,
t1 and t2 are starting and ending points of intervals, and τ is the threshold. The entrance
gain is given by Equation (14). This TSF model consists of 100 trees. The multivariate
model of TSF employs column ensemble, i.e., for each input time series, the TSF model will
be employed, and their aggregate dictates the final classification label. Table 5 shows the
TSF parameters.
E = Entopy + α · Margin (14)
Table 5. TSF Model Parameters.
Classifier Type Input Attributes Training Set and Test Set
Univariate Braking Force Trees: 100









4.4. k-Nearest Neighbour Reasoner
The k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN) method employs instance-based learning, wherein
the training usually occurs when a new case is seen. This model is based on memorising
cases and their corresponding classes, and upon being introduced to a new case during
prediction, the model checks the memory to find a similar case with the closest distance
to the new case in the feature space. The value of “k” is user-defined, and it decides the
number of closest samples considered for the classification of a new case.
For a classifying time series, Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) needs to be set as the dis-
tance metric employed in the k-NN model. DTW is used to measure the similarity between
the two-time series. In DTW, points of one-time series are mapped to a corresponding
point such that the distance between them is shortest. The k-NN algorithm assigns the test
case with the label of the majority class among its “k” number nearest neighbours.
The univariate model intakes the time series attribute braking force, while the multi-
variate model is fed with the features braking force, wheel slip, motor temperature, and
motor shaft angular displacement. For the multivariate model, the features are concate-
nated into a single feature by the model before employing the DTW. The k-NN parameters
are shown in Table 6.
Table 6. k-NN Model Parameters.
Classifier Type Input Attributes Training Set and Test Set
Univariate
Neighbours: 1 Split—Train: Test = 3:1












5. Results and Discussion
As mentioned previously, each model is evaluated by the criteria of accuracy, precision,
recall and F1-score. ML algorithms at large are stochastic or non-deterministic, implying
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that the output varies with each run or implementation. Hence, the performance of the
model is evaluated in terms of average accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score.
5.1. Univariate Models
Following the reasoners’ development, the LSTM model results are shown in Figure 7
and Table 7. It can be seen that the model has wrongly identified two cases of OC (label
1) as jamming faults (label 3) and one instance of jamming as OC. It is also worth noting
that all instances of IOC (label 2) were correctly identified, and no false positives were
generated for this type of fault. The results obtained for LSTM univariate model are shown
in Table 7.
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Table 7. LSTM Univariate Performance.
Average Accuracy 85.3%
Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
OC 89.5% 71.7% 79.4%
IOC 92.8% 100% 96.1%
Jam ing 77.1% 90.0% 83.0%
The TSF model showed high accuracy consistently, with the average being 99.34% and
not dropping below 97%. The model showcases 100% accuracy for 8 out of 10 iterations.
The only misclassification during this iteration is the classification of an instance of IOC
as an OC fault. Figure 8 and Table 8 show the TSF confusion matrix and univariate
performance values, respectively.
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Table 8. TSF Univariate Performance.
Average Accuracy 99.3%
Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
OC 97.9% 100% 98.9%
IOC 100% 98.3% 99.1%
Jamming 100% 100% 100%
Lastly, the k-NN univariate model was tested ten times, and the average accuracy for
this model was 72.3%, being the lowest and highest accuracy achieved 80% and 66.7%,
respectively. Figure 9 and Table 9 displays the k-NN confusion matrix and performance,
respectively. From the confusion matrix, one instance of OC was misclassified as jamming,
two IOC as OC, and three cases of jamming as OC. It is also worth noticing that no false
negatives were predicted for jamming. It can also be observed that the recall rate for
jamming is very low, even though the precision rate is very acceptable.
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Table 9. k-NN Univariate Performance.
Average Accuracy 72.3%
Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
OC 62.4% 83.1% 70.8%
IOC 100% 89.8% 94.4%
Jamming 61.6% 42.1% 49.3%
5.2. Multivariate Models
The LSTM multivariate model considers four time series data strings for classifying
the input instance. Running ten iterations with the model gave an average accuracy of
30.7%. Figure 10 and Table 10 show the LSTM confusion matrix and performance table,
respectively. It can be noted that the model identifies all the test cases as jamming faults.
This, in turn, leads to high false-positive cases of jamming faults and simultaneously high
false negatives for OC and IOC. From the matrix for the second case, it can be seen that
the model labels all of the test instances as IOC, thereby generating a high number of
false-positive cases for the same, which also contributes to a high number of false-negative
cases for OC and jamming.
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Average Accuracy 30.7%
Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
OC 0% 0% 0%
IOC 10.7% 40.0% 16.9%
J ing 20.0% 60. % .
The performance of the TSF multivariate model is discussed next. The average
accuracy of the model is 34.3%, 50% being the highest and 23.3% the lowest. It can be
gathered from the confusion matrices that the model is highly susceptible to misclassify
OC faults, generating several false-negative alerts for IOC and OC faults. Figure 11 and
Table 11 display the model confusion matrix and performance.
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Average Accuracy 34.3%
Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
OC 47.7% 24.7% 31.9%
IOC 27.0% 35.7% 30.5%
Jamming 31.9% 51.3% 38.7%
The confusion matrix obtained after employing the k-NN in taking multiple features
as input is shown below. The overall accuracy of this classifier is 36.7%. The recall, precision
and F1-score is 46.7% for OC, which is the most performance shown by this classifier for any
type of fault. Figure 12 and Table 12 show the confusion matrix and the model performance,
respectively.
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Table 12. k-NN Multivariate Performance.
Average Accuracy 36.7%
Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
OC 46.7% 46.7% 46.7%
IOC 20.0% 28.6% 23.5%
Jamming 20.0% 12.5% 15.4%
5.3. Model Comparison
Accuracy is a good parameter to consider for judging the performance of a system as
a whole, but it fails to capture details, such as false-positive predictions or the inability to
identify faults that are present. Details such as these are especially important in the context
of frequency and criticality of failures that the reasoner is being used to identify.
Here it can be seen that among the univariate models, the reasoner employing the
TSF model is the most accurate, with 99.3% accuracy. This is followed by the LSTM model
providing 85.3% and, lastly, the k-NN model with 72.3%. Contrary to the univariate
models, the k-NN multivariate model is the most accurate of the three models with 36.7%
accuracy, followed by the TSF and LSTM with 34.3% and 30.7%, respectively. Accuracy
is an effective indicator of performance when the distribution chosen for the dataset for
testing is symmetric. For this experiment, the test data are programmed such that it is not
always symmetric so as to depict real-life scenarios. Therefore, it will not be appropriate
to consider accuracy as a sole indicator of a reasoner performance. Table 13 displays the
comparison in model accuracy from the experiment.
Table 13. ML Model Accuracy Comparison.
Univariate Multivariate
LSTM TSF k-NN LSTM TSF k-NN
Accuracy 85.3% 99.3% 72.3% 30.7% 34.3% 36.7%
Another parameter to consider is precision, which in the experiment gives an idea
of the ratio of correctly identified OC faults to the total number of OC faults predicted by
the model. It can be observed that again, the TSF univariate model provides the highest
precision, followed by the LSTM and k-NN models. Among the multivariate models,
the LSTM model was unable to identify any faults and the k-NN multivariate was able
to achieve a precision of 46.7%. The higher precision of the TSF univariate model is an
indicator that it had produced the lowest false positives among the models compared in
this experiment. Table 14 show the performance parameters of the OC fault classification.
Table 14. Performance Parameters for OC Classification.
Model Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
LSTM Univariate 89.5% 71.7% 79.4%
TSF Univariate 97.9% 100% 98.9%
k-NN Univariate 62.4% 83.1% 70.8%
LSTM Multivariate 0% 0% 0%
TSF Multivariate 47.7% 24.7% 31.9%
k-NN Multivariate 46.7% 46.7% 46.7%
The recall rate for classifying OC informs the observer of the number of faults that
the classifier was able to identify among the total number of OC faults introduced to it.
The TSF univariate model has the highest recall rate showcasing the ability to identify all
the relevant cases it was shown. The next best value for this metric is showcased by a
k-NN univariate model with a recall rate of 83.1%, followed by an LSTM single feature
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model with 71.7%, k-NN multivariate with 46.7%, TSF multivariate with 24.7%, and LSTM
multi-feature with no recalling ability. It is worth noting that even though the recall rate is
good for the k-NN univariate model, the precision rate is around 60%, indicating that it
was able to identify a large number of OC faults at the cost of incorrectly classifying some
other faults as OC.
F1-score is a measure that gives equal importance to both precision and recall. TSF
univariate has the highest score with 98.9%, and the LSTM univariate comes in second
with 79.4%. The F1-score for the k-NN univariate model can be said to be a decent 70.8%.
Similarly, for the classification of IOC, both TSF and k-NN univariate models offer
100% precision implying no false-positive cases were recorded. The next best precision
is offered by LSTM univariate model with 92.8% precision, followed by TSF, k-NN and
LSTM multivariate models with 27.0%, 20.0%, and 10.7%, respectively. Concurrently, the
LSTM univariate can identify all the IOC faults it encounters, and the TSF and k-NN single
feature models can identify 98.3% and 89.8%, respectively, of all the faults from the set. The
multivariate models follow the trend of poor performance it showcased in the OC fault
before, with the LSTM model having the ability to recall only 40%, TSF only 35.7%, and
k-NN only 28.6% of the relevant instances. The consolidated results for IOC are shown in
Table 15.
Table 15. Performance Parameters for IOC Classification.
Model Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
LSTM Univariate 92.8% 100% 96.0%
TSF Univariate 100% 98.3% 99.1%
k-NN Univariate 100% 89.8% 94.4%
LSTM Multivariate 10.7% 40.0% 16.9%
TSF Multivariate 27.0% 35.7% 30.5%
k-NN Multivariate 20.0% 28.6% 23.5%
The TSF univariate model achieves 100% precision, recall and F1-scores for identi-
fying jamming faults, indicating that the predictions had zero false-positive cases while
simultaneously successfully managing to identify all the jamming faults it came across.
The LSTM single feature provides the next best performance across all three metrics with
precision, recall and F1-score of 77.1%, 90% and 83.0%, respectively. The k-NN univariate
and the multivariate models have relatively poor performance, with k-NN univariate the
best among the rest with a precision of 61.6%, recall of 42.1%, and F1-score of 49.3%. Out of
the multivariate models, the LSTM has the highest recalling ability of 60% against the 51.3%
provided by TSF and 12.5% provided by k-NN, while TSF offers better precision (31.9%)
when compared to LSTM (20%) and k-NN (20%). The k-NN multivariate model offers the
least performance with precision, recall and F1-score of 20%, 12.5% and 15.4%, respectively.
Table 16. displays the model’s performance for the jamming fault classification.
Table 16. Performance Parameters for Jamming Classification.
Model Average Precision Average Recall Average F1-Score
LSTM Univariate 77.1% 90.0% 83.0%
TSF Univariate 100% 100% 100%
k-NN Univariate 61.6% 42.1% 49.3%
LSTM Multivariate 20.0% 60.0% 30.0%
TSF Multivariate 31.9% 51.3% 38.7%
k-NN Multivariate 20.0% 12.5% 15.4%
6. Conclusions
In this project, three faults were simulated, namely, open circuit, intermittent open
circuit fault, and jamming faults, in an aircraft’s electric braking system. The characteristics
of the faults were analysed, and the input features for the models were selected. Following
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this, an LSTM model was developed, and its performance was compared against k-NN
and TSF univariate and multivariate models.
There are numerous factors to keep in mind while selecting the appropriate model for
identifying a fault. For identifying faults that are equally likely to occur, accuracy might
be a good indicator, and so employing the univariate TSF machine learning algorithm is
recommended because it provides the highest accuracy. In real life, though, the faults rarely
occur in symmetric distribution, and so accuracy is not an ideal indicator to measure the
performance of the model.
Electrical faults are highly critical, and so it will be more cost-efficient to correctly
identify all faults, even if the predictor occasionally generates false positives. Henceforth,
it would be ideal to choose models that have high recall metrics, which in this case is the
TSF univariate model for OC faults and LSTM univariate for IOC faults. Jamming faults
occur less frequently and have a criticality factor less than that of electrical faults, and so
precision might be of greater importance. Here, TSF univariate models provide both high
precision and recall (100%) in identifying jamming faults, making it the ideal choice.
The decision on what metric is appropriate to evaluate the performance depends on
whether the cost incurred due to failure to detect a fault is greater or if the cost associated
with grounding an aircraft due to misidentification is more expensive. In the unlikely case
that both are equally costly, F1-score is a good metric used to select the model. The TSF
univariate model offers the best F1-score for all three faults, making it the obvious choice
in this case.
OEMs or airline providers can also choose to either implement multiple algorithms
with each dedicated to identifying a specific fault or choose a single model that is selected
after ranking the faults depending on their criticality and probability of occurrence and
choosing the appropriate metric to select the model.
7. Future Work
A more realistic configuration of the EBS model can be developed in the future,
building on the work undertaken in this paper. Applying the methods to a more realistic
and wider dataset of rich quality can be carried out to further increase the quality of
results as data-driven techniques are heavily dependent on data distribution. In this
experiment, data required to train the reasoners were generated from a Simulink model
and so represented data from an ideal world. This data can be considered as “clean data”,
which is orderly and has no noise components. Normally, data obtained from sensors are
plagued by noise and often require extensive pre-processing. A more reliable reasoner can
be developed if the contribution of this noise is also taken into account as misclassifications
commonly occur in classification boundaries, and the addition of noise contributes to
this uncertainty. Obtaining actual sensor data from an EBS and training the models will
enable us to better predict the performance of the reasoner in live environments and can
potentially increase the performance of the existing reasoner as well.
The performance of the ML algorithms deployed by the users can be improved by
training it with a larger, richer dataset containing more cases, and also by further fine-tuning
the parameters. Furthermore, the reasoner presented in this experiment is developed for
offline analysis. An online reasoner for fault detection in EBS could be considered for the
future as it would help the maintenance team to be prepared and help them reduce the
turn-around time at airports if the faults are minor and easily repairable.
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